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Case of Wal-Mart 
Mark A. Fox 
The retailing of pre-recorded music has been an area of investigation that has long been 
neglected by popular music researchers. This paper focuses on the world’s largest music 
retailer, Wal-Mart, and its impact on traditional chain and independent music retailers. 
Many of the compact discs sold by Wal-Mart are sold as loss-leaders to attract consumers 
to buy other products. The response of traditional retailers to Wal-Mart and other mass-
market discounters, i.e. minimum advertised price programs, is examined—as is the 
inability of traditional music retailers to claim that Wal-Mart is engaging in predatory 
pricing. I then examine the impact of Wal-Mart on the censorship of music. The paper 
concludes with some directions for future research, including a call for an examination of 
how traditional retailers can effectively compete against mass-market discounters. 
Introduction 
In the United States concerns about the abuse of market power in the music industry 
tend to focus on the following issues: 
N Oligopoly power—the ‘‘Big Four’’ labels (EMI, Sony-BMG, Universal, and Warner) 
control 80% of worldwide music sales (‘‘Sony and BMG’’). 
N Payola—the Attorney General for New York is currently investigating the 
N Ticket sales, where Ticketmaster holds a near monopoly by virtue of exclusive 
N 
contracts with most major concert venues (‘‘Pearl Jam’s Testimony’’). 
Concert production and promotion—one company, Clear Channel Communications, 
generates around 70% of concert revenues in the US through their music production 
N 
and promotion division (Clear Channel). 
Clear Channel also owns around 1,200 radio stations nationwide, dominates the Top 
40 format and controls 60% of all rock formats (Boehlert, ‘‘Suit’’; Yang). 
use of 
independent promoters by record companies seeking to have their artists played by 
radio stations (Boehlert, ‘‘Payola’’; Hopkins). 
N Music television, where Viacom dominates through its ownership of the VH1, MTV, 
MTV2, and Country Music Television networks. 
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N Artist contracts, where artists claim that labels use their power to misrepresent 
royalties or bind them to contracts (under the so-called ‘‘seven-year rule’’) that would 
not be permissible in other professions. 
While these areas are certainly worthy of our attention, this paper will focus on an 
oftentimes ignored aspect of market power, namely market power in music retailing. 
In general, music retailing has been neglected as an area of investigation by popular 
music scholars. As Paul du Gay and Keith Negus observe, ‘‘[t]he record shop has 
been strangely absent from most histories of pop, and neglected or merely mentioned 
in passing accounts of its production and consumption’’ (397). 
From an examination of the popular and business press over recent years, one 
could be forgiven for believing that the major threat facing chain and independent 
music stores is the advent of digital downloads. For example, in 2000 Eric Boehlert 
proposed that ‘‘[c]onfronted by an apocalyptic mix of blank CDs and Napster, the 
record shop faces extinction—in 12 months’’ (‘‘The Death of Music Retail’’). More 
recently, in 2004, Pimm Fox suggests: ‘‘Call it the neutron-bomb effect: In less than a 
decade, the aisles of music retailers will be empty. I predict that online music sites 
such as Apple’s iTunes, Napster and Sony’s Connect will have drained Virgin 
Megastores, HMVs and Tower Records of their customers.’’ 
With the rapid growth of peer-to-peer services and the emergence of pay-per-song 
and subscription sites, it is hardly surprising that the music industry has paid 
considerable attention to the competitive impact of music being made available 
online (for free, through piracy, or commercially).1 However, contrary to rumors of 
their demise, brick-and-mortar retail stores remain the major source of music sales. 
According to the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), these stores 
accounted for 86% of music sales in 2003—see Table 1. What is most telling about 
sales of music from brick-and-mortar stores is the increased influence of stores that 
we would not consider to be traditional record stores. A key contention of this paper 
is that these non-traditional record stores, typically mass-market discounters—such 
as Best Buy, Circuit City, Target, K-Mart, and Wal-Mart—have amassed significant 
Table 1 Market Share of Music Distribution Channels, 1989 to 2003, Based on 
Manufacturers’ Shipments at Suggested List Prices 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Record Store 71.7 69.8 62.1 60.0 56.2 53.3 52.0 49.9 51.8 50.8 44.5 42.4 42.5 36.8 33.2 
Other Store 15.6 18.5 23.4 24.9 26.1 26.7 28.2 31.5 31.9 34.4 38.3 40.8 42.4 50.7 52.8 
Tape/Record 7.9 8.9 11.1 11.4 12.9 15.1 14.3 14.3 11.6 9.0 7.9 7.6 6.1 4.0 4.1 
Club 
TV, Newspaper, 4.5 2.5 3.0 3.2 3.8 3.4 4.0 2.9 2.7 2.9 2.5 2.4 3.0 2.0 1.5 
etc. 
Internet N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.3 1.1 2.4 3.2 2.9 3.4 5.0 
Source: Recording Industry Association of America (‘‘Consumer Profile’’) 
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market power and pose a considerable competitive threat to both chain and 
independent music stores.2 To support this contention, consider the following two 
sets of data on music sales, from the RIAA and SoundScan. 
Data from the RIAA demonstrate that the market share of music sold through 
‘‘other stores’’, i.e. stores that sell goods other than pre-recorded music, has increased 
from 15.6% of all music sales in 1989 to 52.8% in 2003 (RIAA, ‘‘Consumer Profile’’). 
At the same time, the market share of traditional music stores has declined—from 
71.7% of total sales in 1989 to 33.2% in 2003. Music clubs have also seen their market 
share decline, from around 8% in the late 1990s to around 4% in recent years. 
Certainly the advent of Internet music sales has made inroads into the market share 
of non-Internet providers, rising from 0.3% of total sales in 1997 to around 5% in 
2003, but it appears that traditional record stores have lost significant market share to 
other stores that sell music. 
The general trends apparent in the RIAA figures are supported by market research 
firm SoundScan (quoted in Almighty Institute of Music Retail), who found that 
mass-market discounters (such as Wal-Mart, Target, and Best Buy) increased their 
share of music sales from 26% in 1996 to 34.9% in 2003 (an extra $1.3 billion in 
sales). During this period sales by chain stores (such as Sam Goody, Virgin, and 
Tower) declined from 60.3% to 50.4% and sales by independent music retailers 
declined from 13.4% to 10.8%. 
The competitive pressures that traditional record stores are facing are also 
evidenced when we examine figures on music store closings and bankruptcies over 
recent years—see Table 2. It is estimated that in 2003 and 2004 around 1,200 stores 
closed (Cohen). Recent years also saw bankruptcy reorganizations by both Tower 
Records and Wherehouse Entertainment. 
We now turn our attention to the world’s largest music retailer, Wal-Mart, and 
proceed to discuss how traditional music retailers have responded to mass-market 
discounters in general. I then demonstrate why there appears to be no legal case to be 
made that Wal-Mart is engaging in predatory pricing. Finally, I examine the impact 
that Wal-Mart is having in terms of influencing the music that consumers have 
available to listen to. 
Wal-Mart’s Market Power 
The largest retailer of music is Wal-Mart—the world’s largest company, which as of 
January 2005 has 3,617 stores across the US and another 1,603 around the world 
(Wal-Mart). Wal-Mart’s annual sales are $256 billion (‘‘Forbes 2000’’). Wal-Mart is 
also the largest private-sector employer, with around 1.3 million employees 
worldwide, including over 1 million in the United States (Bhatnagar; Dube and 
Jacobs; National Public Radio). The company’s influence is such that economists 
refer to the ‘‘Wal-Mart effect’’—the observation that Wal-Mart, though creating 
productivity gains, has suppressed inflation (Bianco and Zellner). In 2002, Wal-Mart 
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Table 2 Some US Music Store Closings and Bankruptcies in Recent Years 
Chain Closings 
CD Warehouse Closed 23 of its 250-odd stores in 2002. 
Harmony House Liquidated in 2002, closing 19 of 21 stores. 
HMV Closed all nine of its US stores between 2002 and 2004. 
Musicland (Media Jan. 2001: Best Buy purchases MusicLand for $685 million, 
Play, Sam Goody obtaining 1,300+ retail stores. 
and SunCoast) 
Jan. 2003: Best Buy announces that it will close 110 Musicland 
stores (90 Sam Goody stores and 20 SunCoast stores). 
June 2003: Best Buy sells Musicland, which made an operating loss 
of $72 million on sales of $1.73 billion in the financial year 
ending 2003. No cash was involved in the transaction and the 
buyer assumed all liabilities of MusicLand. 
Record Express Liquidated in 2002, closing 14 of 16 stores. 
Tower 2002: $57.2 million net loss, its fourth straight loss. 
February 2004: Tower records parent company, MTS Inc, files for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
March 2004: Emerges from bankruptcy with creditors owning 85% 
of company and looking to sell. 
Wherehouse Jan. 2003: Files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, announcing 
Entertainment that it will close 120 of 370 stores. 
October 2003: Trans World Entertainment acquires Wherehouse 
for $35.6 million in cash and $5 million in assumed liabilities. 
Sources: ‘‘Best Buy to Close 110’’; ‘‘Best Buy Sells’’; ‘‘Best Buy Successfully’’; Butler; ‘‘CD 
Warehouse’’; Christman; Dougherty; Lee and Capell; Lee and Sager; ‘‘Reinventing Kmart’’; ‘‘Trans 
World’’; Wasserman; ‘‘Wherehouse Files’’ 
was estimated to have saved US customers $20 billion on its own products and 
$100 billion when taking into account the price pressure Wal-Mart places on 
competitors (Bianco and Zellner). 
Wal-Mart is a market leader in a number of industries: In the United States it is the 
nation’s largest retailer of apparel, bedding, groceries, jewelry, and toys (Dube and 
Jacobs). Of particular interest to us is the fact that Wal-Mart is the largest music 
retailer, accounting for 20% of recorded music sales in the US (the company also 
accounts for 14% of worldwide music sales and makes one-in-five major-label album 
sales) (Cohen; Rousseau; ‘‘Wal-Mart to Start’’). 
As is commonplace in many retailing environments, Wal-Mart and other mass-
market discounters sell some products as loss-leaders. We will now discuss this 
practice, and show how traditional music retailers reacted to it. 
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Loss Leader Pricing Strategy and Competitors’ Response 
The loss-leader pricing strategy (also termed ‘‘below-cost’’ selling) is when a 
manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer sells a good or service at or below cost in order 
to attract (hopefully new) customers and obtain revenue on other (typically more 
costly) items. Loss-leader products tend to be offered in situations where it is also 
common for consumers to buy complementary or unrelated merchandise (Walters 
and Rinne). Loss-leader products offer an incentive for consumers to shop at a given 
store. Rajiv Lal describes the logic of offering loss-leading products as follows: 
Since there are costs to shopping at more than one store, consumers often buy 
goods that are loss-leaders which are generally priced to adequately compensate for 
deals offered on loss-leaders. Thus loss-leaders increase store traffic which 
presumably leads to higher profits though the sale of other products bought by 
the consumer. (3) 
In order to encourage ongoing patronage of a particular store, loss-leaders tend to 
be products that consumers buy frequently. For loss-leaders to be effective, 
consumers must be aware of the ‘‘regular’’ price of the product so that they see 
the loss-leader product as a bargain (‘‘Loss Leader’’). 
Supermarkets commonly use loss-leaders (in the form of specials on soft drinks, 
sugar, milk, canned goods, etc.) to attract customers to purchase groceries at their 
store, rather than that of a competitor (Walters and Rinne). The strategy is also 
commonplace in the gasoline industry where companies such as Marathon often 
make their profits from the convenience store aspect of their business, rather than 
from sales of gasoline (Bronson). In the music industry songs sold for 99 cents over 
iTunes have a limited profit margin and are considered to be almost a loss-leader— 
used by Apple Computer, Inc. to generate sales for the iPod players (Cuneo et al.). In 
the brick-and-mortar world of music retailing, Wal-Mart, along with other mass-
market discounters such as Best Buy and Target, uses compact discs as a loss-leader, 
purchasing the CDs from distributors for around $12 and selling them for less than 
$10 (Cohen). 
Owing largely to competition by mass-market discounters, CD prices dropped 
from around $14.99 to as low as $9.99 by the mid-1990s (Office of the Attorney 
General of New York). The result of this was a price war in the market for compact 
discs. Traditional music retailers were unhappy with the competitive pressures to 
reduce CD prices that they were facing from mass-market discounters, including 
Wal-Mart. In February 1995, Jack Eugster, the CEO of the music retailer Musicland 
and President of the National Association of Music Retailers (NARM), delivered 
the keynote address at the NARM convention. In that address Mr Eugster stated 
that: 
For years, wholesalers in many industries have found that minimum advertised 
price programs [MAP] to qualify co-op dollars have been especially effective in 
supporting the value of perceptions of their merchandise. Most music companies 
and movie studios have MAP policies. These programs accomplish their goals best 
when the MAP is sufficiently above wholesale costs as to not de-value the product 
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in the consumers’ mind. Also, effective MAP programs consider in-store pricing as 
well as advertised policies and condition co-op support for the entire ad on MAP 
compliance. (United States District Court) 
The major distributors of music (under pressure from traditional music retailers) 
introduced increasingly stringent MAP policies—with the effect that there was a ban 
on informing consumers of discounted prices in print media, electronic media, and 
in-store displays (with the exception of stickers on the CDs themselves). Stores that 
violated this policy would have promotional support cut for a period of 60 to 90 days 
(and violations by an individual store could mean that such support was withdrawn 
from an entire chain). 
According to the Federal Trade Commission, the intent of these efforts was to 
‘‘illegally modif[y] their existing cooperative advertising programs to induce retailers 
into charging consumers higher prices for CDs, allowing the distributors to raise their 
own prices’’ (Federal Trade Commission).3 
In 2000 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) settled charges with the five largest 
music distributors at the time (Universal Music and Video Distribution, Sony Corp. 
of America, Time-Warner Inc., EMI Music Distribution, and Bertelsmann Music 
Group), who agreed to abandon MAPs. The Chairman of the FTC, Robert Pitofsky, 
observed that MAP may have led consumers to pay as much as $480 million during 
the preceding three-year period (Federal Trade Commission). 
The final settlement of the MAP case was for $67.4 million, to be distributed to 
individual states—with consumers being able to seek compensation (Lieberman). 
Also, as part of the settlement CDs valued at $75.7 million were to be distributed to 
public and non-profit groups (Lieberman). 
Legal Implications of Wal-Mart’s Pricing Policy 
Efforts in the 1990s by traditional record retailers (and by the major record 
companies’ distribution companies) to curtail the pricing strategies of Wal-Mart and 
other mass-market discounters using MAPs were unsuccessful. However, the actions 
of Wal-Mart and others in selling CDs as loss-leaders raise another legal question, 
namely is Wal-Mart engaging in predatory pricing? 
Predatory pricing occurs when a dominant firm sells a product at a loss with the 
objective of driving competitors from the marketplace. As Thomas J. DiLorenzo 
explains: 
The predatory pricing argument is very simple. The predatory firm first lowers its 
price until it is below the average cost of its competitors. The competitors must 
then lower their prices below average cost, thereby losing money on each unit sold. 
If they fail to cut their prices, they will lose virtually all of their market share; if they 
do cut their prices, they will eventually go bankrupt. After the competition has been 
forced out of the market, the predatory firm raises its price, compensating itself for 
the money it lost while it was engaged in predatory pricing, and earns monopoly 
profits forever after. 
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In the US, claims of predatory pricing fall under Section 2(a) of the Sherman Act. The 
relevant section of the Sherman Act states that: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any 
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding 
$10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment 
not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the 
court. (United States Department of Justice) 
It is extremely rare for claims of predatory claims to be tried, and even rarer for 
such claims to be successful (Matsushita 589). The Supreme Court has upheld in 
various cases that there are very real competitive benefits to consumers from price 
competition. Notable cases and key findings include the following: 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 1986 
[C]utting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of 
competition. Thus, mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are especially 
costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect. 
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 1986 
The kind of competition that [plaintiff] alleges here, competition for increased 
market share, is not activity forbidden by the antitrust laws. It is simply, as 
petitioners claim, vigorous competition. To hold that the antitrust laws protect 
competitors from the loss of profits due to such price competition would, in effect, 
render illegal any decision by a firm to cut prices in order to increase market 
share.…[I]t is in the interest of competition to permit dominant firms to engage in 
vigorous competition, including price competition. 
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 1993 
[T]he costs of an erroneous finding of liability are high.…It would be ironic indeed 
if the standards for predatory pricing liability were so low that antitrust suits 
themselves became a tool for keeping prices high. (American Airlines) 
A case of predatory pricing against Wal-Mart would likely involve a three-part test: 
First, is Wal-Mart deliberately reducing its profits (or incurring a loss) for a period of 
time? Second, are Wal-Mart’s actions taken with the ‘‘intent’’ of driving competitors 
out of business? And third, if competitors are driven out of business, will Wal-Mart 
be able to recover the losses that it incurred while engaging in predatory pricing? 
The answer to the first question is yes (Wal-Mart sells many of its CDs at or 
below cost and has done so for many years). The answer to the second question 
is likely to be no as Wal-Mart’s actions are not designed to drive competitors out 
of business. Rather, Wal-Mart’s pricing of CDs is intended to attract consumers 
to their discount stores, so that those consumers will purchase other products. 
Also, music sales comprise only 2% of Wal-Mart’s overall sales, making it prima 
facie straightforward for Wal-Mart to argue that they have little (direct) financial 
incentive to drive other music retailers out of business. Finally, Wal-Mart is 
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unlikely to recover losses if it drives competitors out of business. In such a case, if 
Wal-Mart raised its prices consumers would gravitate to other discount retailers 
where these CD are also available or to online sites where they can purchase 
music. In short, as the writers of a Business Week article titled ‘‘Is Wal-Mart too 
Powerful?’’ observe, ‘‘[g]iants like Wal-Mart have wide latitude to do as they wish 
to rivals and suppliers so long as they deliver lower prices to consumers’’ (Bianco 
and Zellner). 
Censorship or Necessary Business Practice? 
While arguments can be made that Wal-Mart’s pricing of CDs as loss-leaders benefits 
consumers, it can also be argued that, in order to appeal to a broad market, Wal-
Mart’s pricing strategy is essential—as is the company’s policy of not stocking records 
that have parental advisory stickers. 
Wal-Mart pursues what is referred to as a cost-leadership business strategy.4 This 
strategy typically involves competing on price, while attempting to control one’s 
costs, in order to maintain higher profit margins than competitors. Wal-Mart is very 
effective at controlling its costs—through one of the most advanced logistics systems 
in the world and through placing pressure on suppliers. 
In order for a cost-leadership strategy to be successful, a mass-market is usually 
necessary so that a large sales volume can cover costs. Wal-Mart believes that, in 
order to cater to this mass-market (or to be ‘‘family friendly’’), they need to sell 
products that most consumers want, at a low price (Wal-Mart’s tag-line is ‘‘Always 
low prices. Always.’’). At the same time, Wal-Mart will not risk offending consumers, 
and therefore chooses not to stock music that has a parental advisory sticker. 
To look at the impact of Wal-Mart’s decisions we need to consider the types of 
areas in which they restrict consumers’ access to music. In the case of Wal-Mart, 
issues of censorship relating to pre-recorded music pertain to three areas, namely: 
lyrical content that is critical of Wal-Mart; cover art; and lyrical content that is such 
that the music being sold requires parental warning stickers. 
Lyrics Directed at Wal-Mart 
In 1996, Wal-Mart refused to stock Sheryl Crow’s self-titled album as lyrics to the 
song ‘‘Love is a Good Thing’’ accused the store of selling guns to minors (‘‘Wal-Mart 
Blues’’). The song, co-written by Crow and Tad Wadhams, contains the lyrics: 
‘‘Watch out sister/Watch out brother/Watch our children as they kill each other/with 
a gun they bought at the Wal-Mart discount stores.’’ The album was withdrawn from 
Wal-Mart shelves after Crow was asked to change the lyrics, and refused. Wal-Mart 
proposed that the lyrics represented ‘‘an unfair, untrue and totally irresponsible 
comment’’ (Harper). Wal-Mart also proposed that the lyrics insulted the chain and 
their employees (Errico). 
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Cover Art 
Wal-Mart will not carry CDs with cover art or lyrics that it deems to be overtly sexual 
or that deal with abortion, homosexuality, or Satanism (Public Broadcasting Service). 
Consider the following examples of cover art being changed, i.e. alternative versions 
of cover art being created, because of Wal-Mart’s policies: Wal-Mart asked John 
Mellencamp to brush out images of Jesus Christ and the Devil on the cover of his 
album Mr. Happy Go Lucky. (The original cover of the album featured a somber 
circus-like scene of Mellencamp and some children, flanked by images of Jesus Christ 
and the Devil.) A spokesperson for Mellencamp, Dawn Bridges, was reported as 
saying at the time that ‘‘John didn’t design the record cover or conceive it so he 
doesn’t feel terribly personal about it. He said, ‘Its OK, fine.’ It’s not like he was asked 
to change his music’’ (Morse). Reportedly the album cover was changed to ensure 
greater record sales (‘‘Wal-Mart Blues’’). 
Wal-Mart also objected to the back cover of the Nirvana Album In Utero, which 
portrayed fetuses. The album cover was changed in order to appease Wal-Mart. In 
Utero was the follow-up to the best-selling Nevermind. 
Metal-rock artist Rob Zombie was asked to change the cover of White Zombie’s 
Superswingin’ Sexy Sounds and ended up painting bikini straps on a naked woman on 
a hammock. (The original cover art has the woman posing in a way that covers up 
areas that could be considered sexually provocative.)5 Zombie comments that ‘‘Wal-
Mart wasn’t going to carry the record the way it was. They suggested we put a big 
black bar across everything. But if we were going to censor it in any way, we wanted it 
to look good. I didn’t do it for Wal-Mart, but for the kids who have no other way of 
getting the music’’ (quoted in Morse). 
To understand the consequences of Wal-Mart’s actions, it is instructive to ask what 
role cover art plays in the artistic and commercial process. This is a topic on which 
relatively little has been written in music and media journals; however, some 
anecdotal advice is provided to artists in various books on how to become successful 
in the music business. For example, Christopher Knab, author of the book Music is 
Your Business proposes that ‘‘[y]our cover is your calling card to the record industry 
and to the consumer…how well you design it and the other graphics for your release 
could well determine your success or failure as a musician.’’ 
It is fair to say that album covers are important as they make a statement about the 
musicians, the music, and even the record label. Consider, for example, the cover art 
of well-known jazz label Blue Note: 
Everything about the Blue Note label in the late 1950s and early 1960s bespoke 
cool.…And topping it all off, Blue Note had those covers. Distinguished by 
[Alfred] Lions’ dramatic, deep shadow musician portraits and designer Reid 
Miles’ imaginative typography, Blue Notes album jackets are beloved not just by 
jazz fans, but by graphic artists and lovers of great design.…The best Blue Note 
jackets are perfect echoes of their contents: Bold, direct, dramatic, soulful, 
strong, just like the hard bop on the thick vinyl inside. They’re cool. 
(Firehammer) 
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The impact that an individual album cover can have on a fan is chronicled in Chuck 
Klosterman’s book, Fargo City Rock, wherein he talks about his initial reaction to the 
cover of the Mötley Crüe album Shout at the Devil: 
As cliché as it now seems, I was wholly disturbed by the Shout at the Devil cover. 
I clearly remember thinking, Who the fuck are these guys? And—more 
importantly—Are these guys even guys? The blond one looked like a chick and 
one of the members was named ‘‘Nikki’’. Fortunately, my sister broached this issue 
seconds after seeing the album cover, and my brother…said ‘‘No, they’re all guys. 
They’re really twisted, but it’s pretty good music.’’ (9) 
Artists and labels that create different versions of their cover art for Wal-Mart 
are inevitably doing so in order to ensure that their music reaches a wider 
audience. One means by which artists may evaluate their own success is record sales, 
which is a proxy for the number of people who listen to (and presumably like) their 
music. 
Parental Warning Stickers 
To understand the actions of Wal-Mart and its consequences we need to consider the 
most significant development in music censorship over the last twenty years, namely 
the introduction of parental warning labels on music. These labels, which today state 
‘‘Parental Advisory: Explicit Content’’, were developed following pressure from the 
Parents Music Resource Center (PMRC). The PMRC was established in 1985 by the 
wives of several influential politicians, most notably Tipper Gore, Susan Baker, and 
Nancy Thurmond (‘‘Parents Music Resource Center’’). This group was founded 
initially ‘‘to educate and inform parents of this alarming new trend…towards lyrics 
that are sexually explicit’’ (Parents Music Resource Center 1). The PMRC was 
successful in getting the Senate Commerce, Technology, and Transportation 
Committee to organize a series of hearings to investigate what the PMRC saw as 
the pornographic content of rock music, and to discuss a proposed labeling scheme 
for music. Fearing legislation on this topic, the RIAA (which represented labels 
accounting for 85% of music sales) agreed that its members would institute a 
voluntary labeling scheme. In 1990, this labeling scheme adopted the ‘‘Parental 
Advisor: Explicit Content’’ stickers that we see on some recordings today. The RIAA 
(‘‘Parental Advisory’’) note that these labels are ‘‘a notice to consumers that 
recordings identified by this logo may contain strong language or depictions of 
violence, sex or substance abuse. Parental discretion is advised.’’ As the following 
quote from the RIAA demonstrates, the labeling system, although voluntary, appears 
to have an impact on the content of music recordings: 
The RIAA created and now administers the Parental Advisory program. Individual 
record companies, working with their artists, decide which of their releases should 
be labeled.…In some instances, record companies ask an artist to re-record certain 
songs or to revise lyrics because a creative and responsible view of the music 
demands such a revision. Sometimes songs are simply taken off an album. In other 
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instances, the artist and the record company agree that there is musical and artistic 
credibility in the whole of the work even when the lyrics may be too explicit for 
mainstream distribution. In those instances, the RIAA’s Parental Advisory Label is 
applied prominently to the outside of the permanent packaging. (RIAA, ‘‘Parental 
Advisory’’) 
Needless to say, there is often a marked power imbalance between record 
companies and artists (with some exceptions, such as when an artist has reached 
superstar status). This power imbalance means that artists need the financial and 
promotional support of record companies, which are typically interested in releasing 
music that has mass appeal. For the RIAA to propose that artists and record company 
representatives have a balanced discussion about, for example, lyrics, is misleading. 
The very fact that such conversations take place shows that record companies are 
(understandably) concerned about the wider appeal (and hence, profitability) of an 
artist’s work. These may oftentimes be concerns that musicians share; however, 
musicians—unlike their record companies—are more likely to be concerned with the 
artistic integrity of their work. Hence, when record companies question the lyrical 
content of artists’ work, the artists are put under pressure to consider trade-offs 
between artistic integrity, the support of their record label, and the perceived impact 
of their decisions on record sales. As Claude Chastagner writes in his history of the 
PMRC, ‘‘The PMRC’s insistence on labeling triggered unofficial though effective 
forms of censorship, from refusing to sell to refusing to record or produce artists 
whose lyrics were considered scandalous or licentious, whatever their artistic or social 
value’’ (190). 
In addition to artists facing pressure from their record companies, the labels and 
artists face pressure to alter the content of their music (or cover art for their music) 
from mass-market discounters such as Wal-Mart. In their efforts to maintain what 
they see as a ‘‘family-friendly’’ environment Wal-Mart have ensured that they stock 
music that will not offend conservative shoppers. To this end, the company does not 
sell music in its stores that contains parental guidance stickers. To explain the logic 
for this decision, Wal-Mart used to include the following statement among the 
Frequently Asked Questions section on its website: 
Wal-Mart will not stock music with parental guidance stickers. While Wal-Mart 
sets high standards, it would not be possible to eliminate every image, word or 
topic that an individual might find objectionable. And the goal is not to eliminate 
the need for parents to review the merchandise their children buy. The policy 
simply helps eliminate the most objectionable material from Wal-Mart’s shelves. 
(quoted in Public Broadcasting Service) 
In short, Wal-Mart claims that they do not stock CDs with parental warning 
stickers because of customer preferences and out of a desire to help parents. A Public 
Broadcasting Service documentary about Wal-Mart observes that, ‘‘[w]ith its roots in 
the Southern Christian heartland, Wal-Mart believes that being a ‘family’ store is the 
key to their mass appeal.’’ To some extent, this explains Wal-Mart’s unwillingness to 
stock music and other products that may cause offense to shoppers. Interestingly, the 
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situation in which Wal-Mart has positioned itself is described by John Ryan in his 
book The Production of Culture in the Music Industry. Robert Burnett describes Ryan’s 
critique thus: 
as long as an organization finds itself in a relatively stable environment…the 
organization is likely to attempt to maintain the status quo. This is often done by 
developing products aimed at not offending any group of consumers. Almost 
invariably, this tactic leads to a high level of product homogeneity which does in 
fact alienate portions of the consuming market. If the alienated segment becomes 
large enough, newer firms or firms out of the mainstream are able, through 
product innovation, to make inroads into the market. (756) 
This scenario is evident when we look at Wal-Mart. The company’s actions 
have outraged some individuals, musicians, and record label executives who view 
Wal-Mart as engaging in, or encouraging, censorship. For example, a group calling 
itself Rock Out Censorship (ROC) urges consumers to boycott Wal-Mart, stating 
that ‘‘[Wal-Mart’s censorship] basically works as a corporate mechanism to keep 
the music industry in line, creating a situation where the artists face economic ruin 
if they dare cross Wal-Mart’s ‘line in the family-values sand’.’’ In a similar vein, 
Jon Katz, writing in The Netizen in 1996, suggested that readers boycott 
Wal-Mart because ‘‘Wal-Mart shouldn’t be allowed to set the country’s cultural 
agenda.’’ 
Despite such concerns—and as a consequence of Wal-Mart’s policy regarding 
music with parental advisory labels—the major record companies invariably provide 
Wal-Mart with sanitized versions of albums. In light of the size of Wal-Mart’s 
customer base, the major record labels feel some pressure to do this. As one EMI 
Executive Vice President observes, ‘‘[y]ou can’t have 100% impact when you are 
taking an artist to a mainstream audience if you don’t have the biggest player, Wal-
Mart’’ (quoted in Bianco and Zellner). 
Discussion and Directions for Future Research 
Consumers pay a price of sorts for Wal-Mart’s market power and focus on family 
values as Wal-Mart does not stock music that contains parental warning stickers. In 
smaller towns, where Wal-Mart may be the only music retailer, consumers— 
particularly those consumers without Internet access—will have limited ability to buy 
music with parental warning stickers. Wal-Mart claims that it is supporting parents 
by not selling music with parental advisory stickers, and that it is meeting the 
preferences of its consumers. No support is provided for such statements. The notion 
that Wal-Mart is helping parents by eliminating undesirable merchandise from 
shelves sounds somewhat patronizing: in essence, Wal-Mart is making choices for 
parents about what is objectionable and what is not. For Wal-Mart to stock 
merchandise with parental warning stickers would simply be giving parents (and 
their children) more choices about what music they can buy. 
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Wal-Mart’s argument that it does not stock some music owing to consumer 
preferences is a self-fulfilling prophecy: given that Wal-Mart is the world’s largest 
music retailer, if they choose not to stock individual CDs there is likely to be a lower 
demand for such CDs. Several research questions come to mind when looking at 
these dynamics: 
1. How do parents (and other shoppers) use parental advisory stickers to make choices 
about their music purchasing decisions? 
2. To what extent are the values of individual shoppers influential in making choices 
about whether or not to purchase an album with (or without) a parental advisory 
sticker? 
3. When given a choice between buying a ‘‘sanitized’’ CD at Wal-Mart versus going 
elsewhere—perhaps at greater cost—to buy a CD with a parental warning sticker, 
what would lead consumers to pursue the latter course of action? 
This paper has also raised questions about the pressure that artists and their music 
companies feel from Wal-Mart to ensure that their lyrical content and cover art do 
not cause offense. In this regard two research questions come to mind: 
1. Do artists and record labels self-censor so that ‘‘sanitized’’ versions of CDs are created 
for Wal-Mart and other conservative retailers? What impact does this have on record 
sales? 
2. Do artists who choose not to release ‘‘sanitized’’ versions of CDs have more 
credibility with their fans? 
While Wal-Mart uses its market power to benefit consumers—who pay lower 
prices for music sold as a loss-leader—consumers have less music to select from 
when shopping at a Wal-Mart store: the typical Wal-Mart store stocks around 
5,000 titles, compared to, say, the average Tower Records store, which has around 
60,000 titles (Cohen). The practice of offering a limited selection of titles makes 
commercial sense for Wal-Mart. Since they operate of stores that offer hundreds of 
product-lines, sales per square foot of retail space will be higher when they choose 
to stock those products that have the highest customer demand. However, having 
said this, if Wal-Mart are successful and small independent record stores close in 
smaller towns, then Wal-Mart is largely dictating what consumer demand will be 
through the products it makes available. Wal-Mart is likely to have a detrimental 
impact on the sales of chain and independent record stores, which would often 
rely upon sales of Top 40 music for a disproportionate amount of their sales 
revenues. 
The impact of mass-market discounters on traditional retailers of music has not 
been empirically investigated; however, there is some research examining the impact 
of Wal-Mart on smaller retailers in general. 
Lori Franz and Edward Robb examined the impact of Wal-Mart on retailing in 
rural Missouri counties. One key finding of their study was that ‘‘[w]idespread 
closings of retail stores were reported for most towns after Wal-Mart’s entry’’ (Ganim 
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Barnes et al. 22). A 1989 study by Kenneth Stone examined the impact of Wal-Mart 
on other businesses in Iowa. He found quite different impacts depending upon the 
products sold by others. When a Wal-Mart opened, businesses that sold the same 
products tended to experience declining sales. In contrast, businesses that sold 
products that Wal-Mart did not stock (e.g. specialty retailers) tended to experience 
higher sales when a Wal-Mart came to town. Stone proposed that this occurred due 
to more people being attracted to the locations where Wal-Mart operated, thereby 
benefiting some other retailers. 
One direction for future research is to ask what impact the arrival of mass-market 
discounters has on the sales and survival of traditional music stores. Related to these 
questions is the need to examine how independent record stores can compete 
effectively against mass-market discounters. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
independent stores approach these competitive pressures by attempting to broaden 
their product offerings (by, for example, offering videos and clothing), by having an 
informed staff who can help suggest music that consumers may like, by focusing on 
genres that their larger competitors do not stock, and by focusing on hard-to-find 
albums about whose purchase customers are less price-sensitive (Eliscu; Murphy). 
In addition to examining the impact of mass-market discounters on traditional 
(brick-and-mortar) music retailers, it may be instructive for future research to 
examine what impact Wal-Mart has on the sales of companies that sell compact discs 
via the Internet, e.g. Amazon.com. Internet retailers typically stock many more titles 
than the average Wal-Mart store. Under a scenario where Wal-Mart enters a town 
and becomes the major music retailer and any traditional music stores close, then 
Internet retailers may pick up some sales of music that Wal-Mart does not stock in its 
stores. The alternative scenario would see Wal-Mart as bringing more consumers to a 
given town and thereby providing opportunities for independent music retailers to 
expand their sales. This could have a detrimental impact on Internet retailers. A study 
that examines individual music buying habits of consumers before versus after Wal-
Mart opens a new store could help shed light on these issues. 
Today, Wal-Mart is the world’s largest music retailer. As Wal-Mart continues to 
grow, it is worth asking what impact it will have on consumers’ music purchasing 
behavior. The relatively limited number of titles that Wal-Mart stores stock, 
combined with the company’s focus on ‘‘family friendly’’ merchandising, may not 
augur well for the success of artists who do not have the support of major record 
labels or who are unwilling to sacrifice their artistic vision for increased record sales. 
Also, historically independent music retailers have played a significant role in setting 
consumer tastes. With sales of such stores declining—partly as a result of the success 
of mass-market discounters—it is worthwhile to examine the role that independent 
music retailers play in setting consumer tastes in this changing retail environment. 
Finally, a study examining the impact of mass-merchandisers on music diversity 
would be beneficial to see what impact mass-market merchandisers are having on the 
availability of music. 
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The suggestions made above are intended as a stimulus for further research in the 
realms of music retailing and the role of corporations such as Wal-Mart in music 
censorship. These areas have traditionally been ignored by popular music researchers. 
In light of the significant market power developed by mass-market discounters, 
traditional chain and independent music stores are facing reduced profits and—in 
some cases—are closing their doors. Asking how these stores may effectively compete 
against mass-market discounters is worthwhile as these traditional stores typically 
offer a wider variety of music for purchase than do mass-market merchandisers. 
These competitive forces also have implications for the success of musicians—if 
mass-market retailers have increasing market power, then it becomes that much more 
difficult for artists on independent labels to reach a wider audience. 
Finally, while Wal-Mart’s policy of not stocking music with parental warning 
stickers is commercially justifiable from the point of view of positioning the company 
as being ‘‘family friendly’’, this practice reduces consumer choice and may well 
impact the lyrical and packaging (cover art) choices made by musicians and their 
record labels. To my knowledge, no research has been conducted on corporate 
censorship and its impact on artists, music labels, and consumers. With more and 
more music being sold through mass-market discounters, who often seek to promote 
a ‘‘family-friendly’’ image, it is worthwhile to examine the impact of such 
censorship—as well as to consider what actions may be undertaken to thwart such 
attempts at censorship. 
Acknowledgments 
This work benefited greatly from the feedback of Gary Burns and Tom McCourt. 
Also, Fred Naffziger, Professor of Business Law at Indiana University South Bend, 
provided useful advice regarding some of the legal issues discussed in this paper. All 
errors or omissions remain the responsibility of the author. 
Notes 
[1] Services such as Apple Computer’s iTunes, where users can download songs for 99 cents each 
have been very successful. As of January 2005, 250 million songs had been paid for and 
downloaded from iTunes, with users downloading over 1.25 million songs every day 
(Smith). Subscription services have not been as successful as was originally predicted, but 
this may change with the re-invention of Napster—which offers access to over one million 
songs for $14.95 per month. For a discussion of the development of Internet business 
models, see Fox (‘‘Technological and Social’’, ‘‘E-commerce’’). 
[2] While the focus of this paper is on mass-market discounters, it is also important to note that 
other non-traditional retailers are reshaping music retailing. One prominent example of such 
a retailer is Starbucks which has its own record label and is collaborating with other labels to 
make music available to the 30 million customers who patronize Starbucks every week. 
Starbucks is also installing Media Bar kiosks in their stores—to permit customers to make 
their own compilation albums (Holmes; Schultz). Starbucks’ Hear Music collaborated with 
Concord Records for Ray Charles’s album Genius Loves Company (‘‘Starbucks Leads’’). The 
album has gone triple platinum, and more of the CDs were sold in Starbucks stores than in 
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any single other retail outlet. Hotels are also increasingly creating compilation albums for 
guests to purchase (Yancy). 
[3] In 2001, the European Commission conducted a similar investigation to determine if the 
major five record labels had colluded to set prices for CDs in the European Union. Evidence 
of price-fixing in Germany (by three of the labels) and in Italy (by one of the labels) was 
discovered. The Commission referred the matter to national authorities in Germany and 
Italy, to conduct their own investigations (‘‘European Commission Ends’’). 
[4] For a general discussion of the concept of generic strategies, as developed by Michael Porter, 
see <http://www.quickmba.com/strategy/generic.shtml>. 
[5] To view the original cover art, see <http://www.robzombie.com>. To view the Wal-Mart 
version, see <http://www.Wal-Mart.com/catalog/product.gsp?product_id5834621>. 
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